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1 Introduction
This article is devoted to the relation between the second law of thermodynamics, which applies to closed
macroscopic systems consisting of an extremely large number of particles, such as liquids or gases, and
classical or quantum mechanics, which are theories that describe systems of interacting particles on a
microscopic level. The second law of thermodynamics states that in a closed system entropy increases
until it reaches a maximum. Then the system has reached equilibrium. Entropy is a property of a “ma-
crostate”, which is characterized by measurable variables such as density ̺(~x) or magnetization M(~x),
which are sums or averages over many particles. The entropy is assumed to be proportional to the lo-
garithm of the number of different “microstates” that correspond to such a macrostate. Based on the
concept of microstates, the second law of thermodynamics (and all other relations of thermodynamics)
can be obtained from statistical mechanics with its basic axiom that in a closed system in equilibrium all
microstates occur with equal probability. This means that transition probabilities between microstates
are such that in the long run no state is preferred.
Now, the microscopic description of a many-particle system in terms of classical or quantum mechanics
differs in two fundamental ways from the statistical mechanics description, which entails the second law
of thermodynamics. First, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are deterministic theories. Given
the initial state of a system, these theories determine its future time evolution. In contrast, statistical
mechanics is a stochastic theory, with probability being an important concept. Second, classical mechanics
and quantum mechanics are time reversible. If a given trajectory is a solution of Newton’s laws, the time
inverted trajectory is also a solution, because Newton’s laws do not change under time reversal, due to the
second derivate with respect to time. Similarly, if a wave fuction ψ(~x, t) is a solution of the Schro¨dinger
equation, its complex conjugate ψ∗(~x, t) is a solution of the time reversed Schro¨dinger equation, giving
exactly the same physical properties, since observables depend only on the absolute value of the wave
function. In contrast, the second law of thermodynamics makes a fundamental distinction between the
two directions of time. The entropy increase occurs only in the forward time direction.
Because of these two fundamental differences, the question arises if and how the second law of ther-
modynamics (and statistical mechanics in general) can be derived from classical or quantum mechanics.
Many textbook authors assume that in principle a macroscopic system is on the microscopic level fully
and correctly described by deterministic, time-reversible laws. Of course, if such a microscopic description
is complete, it must somehow contain all the properties that are perceived in thermodynamic systems
that consist of the order of 1023 particles. Consequently, the irreversible character of the second law is
ascribed by these textbook authors to our inability to obtain knowledge of the precise microscopic state
of the system, combined with special initial conditions for the macroscopic, observable quantities of the
system. This is the so-called ignorance interpretation of probability. Our inability to know the microstate
of the system and to thus predict its future evolution is aggravated by the fact that no system is fully
isolated from the rest of the world. This means that the future evolution of a system is influenced by its
environment. In order to see the deterministic character of a system’s time evolution, one would need
to know the state of its environment, which in turn depends on still another environment, etc. Since it
is impossible to include in our calculations such a wider environment, which might consist of the entire
universe, some textbook authors argue that we have no choice but to describe our system by using the
concept of probabilities.
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At this point it becomes clear that the belief that the time evolution of a many-particle system is
deterministic on the microscopic level is a metaphysical belief. It cannot, even in principle be shown to
be correct. It is a starting assumption on which the subsequent considerations are based, and it is not
the result of scientific observations. In order to assess how reasonable this basic assumption is, one has
to explore its logical consequences. In fact, the debate on how to relate the probabilities of statistical
mechanics to a microscopic view is as old as the theory itself, starting from the Boltzmann-Zermelo debate
and continuing until today, see for instance the contribution by Jos Uffink in (Beisbart and Hartmann,
2011).
In the following, I will argue that the second law of thermodynamics cannot be derived from deter-
ministic time-reversible theories such as classical or quantum mechanics. This means that even simple
macroscopic equilibrium systems such as gases, crystals, or liquids, cannot be fully explained in terms of
their constituent particles, or, to use the wording of the title of this book, that “more is different”. In the
next section, I will challenge the basic assumption of many textbook authors that classical or quantum
mechanics can provide an accurate, comprehensive microscopic description of a thermodynamic system.
Then, I will show that all so-called “derivations” of the basic concepts of statistical mechanics and in
particular of the second law of thermodynamics make - often unadmittedly - assumptions that go beyond
classical or quantum mechanics.
2 The mistaken idea of infinite precision
In classical mechanics, the state of a system can be represented by a point in phase space. The phase
space of a system of N particles has 6N dimensions, which represent the positions and momenta of all
particles. Starting from an initial state, Newton’s laws, in the form of Hamilton’s equations, prescribe
the future evolution of the system. If the state of the system is represented by a point in phase space,
its time evolution is represented by a trajectory in phase space. However, this idea of a deterministic
time evolution represented by a trajectory in phase space can only be upheld within the framework of
classical mechanics if a point in phase space has infinite precision. If the state of a system had only a finite
precision, its future time evolution would no more be fixed by the initial state, combined with Hamilton’s
equations. Instead, many different future time evolutions would be compatible with the initial state. In
practice, it is impossible to know, prepare, or measure the state of a system with infinite precision. This
would require a brain or another computing device that can store an infinite number of bits, which does
not exist in a finite universe. Here, we see again that the belief that classical mechanics can provide a
valid microscopic description of a thermodynamic system is a metaphysical belief.
In quantum mechanics, the state of a system is represented by a wave function, and its time evolution
by the Schro¨dinger equation. Now, in order for the Schro¨dinger equation to fully predict the future
evolution of a quantum mechanical system, not just a point must be specified with inifinite precision,
but a complex-valued function of 3N variables, because the wave function is complex and depends on
the positions of all particles. Even the “simple” enterprise of calculating the ground state wave function
of a many-electron system fails completely for more than 1000 particles, says Walter Kohn, the father of
density functional theory, in his Nobel lecture, quoting his teacher Van Vleck: “The many-electron wave
function is not a legitimate scientific concept for N > 1000 ... because the wave function can neither be
calculated nor recorded with sufficient accuracy” (Kohn, 1999). This illustrates again that the idea that
the state of a system has infinite precision is a metaphysical assumption.
History and philosophy of science have taught us that the idealizations that are contained in the
theories of physics should not be taken as a faithful and perfect reflection of reality. In classical mechanics,
these idealizations include certain concepts of space and time, in addition to a deterministic worldview.
The belief that classical mechanics is a faithful and perfect reflection of physical reality was shattered
100 years ago, when the theory of relativity showed it to be an approximation that is pretty good when
velocities are far below the velocity of light and when gravitational fields are weak enough so that the
curvature of space cannot be perceived. Furthermore, the advent of quantum mechanics made it clear that
classical mechanics is not valid on atomic length scales. In particular, the uncertainty principle states
2
that a point in phase space cannot have infinite precision. This has drastic consequences because the
discovery of chaos demonstrated that in many systems a limited precision of the initial state leads to a
complete uncertainty of its future time evolution beyond a short time horizon.
In quantum mechanics, we know that the Schro¨dinger equation is a good description of a system only
when relativistic effects and radiation effects can be neglected. In addition to these reasons to consider
wave functions and the Schro¨dinger equation only as an approximate description of reality, quantum
mechanics poses a far more fundamental problem. It has itself a part that is inherently stochastic and
irreversible, namely the quantum measurement. With respect to the outcome of a measurement, only pro-
babilities can be given. Furthermore, a measurement process, which includes irreversible changes in the
macroscopic measurement device, does not occur backwards in time, thus making a distinction between
past and future. Landau and Lifschitz suggest in their textbook on statistical physics that the irreversi-
bility of the measurement process is related to the irreversibility of the second law of thermodynamics.
Despite claims made to the contrary by some scientists, the measurement process has not been satisfac-
torily explained in terms of the deterministic evolution of a many-particle wave function according to the
Schro¨dinger equation (Schlosshauer 2004).
All these well known limitations of classical mechanics and quantum mechanics support my argument
that the idea of inifinite precision, which follows from these theories if they are an exact reflection of
reality, is a very questionable concept. The belief that the time evolution of a thermodynamic system is
deterministic and reversible on the microscopic level is a metaphysical assumption that presents a variety
of problems. As soon as the metaphysical assumption of infinite precision is abandoned, the present
state of a system, combined with the microscopic laws of classical or quantum mechanics, does not fully
specify the future time evolution. Therefore, additional laws are needed that specify which types of time
evolutions out of the possible ones are taken by the system.
I will therefore join those textbook authors that maintain that statistical mechanics is a field of physics
in its own right, which is not contained in deterministic, time-reversible microscopic theories. Statistical
mechanics has its own axiom, namely the axiom of “equal a priori probabilities”. This axiom states that
in a closed system in equilibrium all microstates occur with equal probability. From this axiom, all of
statistical mechanics can be derived.
In the next section, I will show that even those scientists who “derive” the law of equal a priori
probabilities and the second law of thermodynamics from classical mechanics, make in fact assumptions
that go beyond classical mechanics. Then, we will briefly look at other approaches to the relation between
classical and statistical mechanics, which openly employ additional assumptions and thus admit that
statistical mechanics cannot be shown to be contained in classical mechanics. In Section 3, we will then
take a short survey of the different possible ways to relate statistical mechanics to quantum mechanics,
encountering similar and even worse challenges than for classical mechanics.
3 From classical mechanics to statistical mechanics
3.1 The standard argument
As already mentioned, every “derivation” of statistical mechanics from classical mechanics starts from the
metaphysical assumption that classical mechanics can provide a complete and deterministic description
of a 1023-particle system. An important part of this assumption is the idea that the state of a system has
infinite precision. We will now start from this assumption and develop the usual arguments that can be
found in many textbooks. We will see that in fact the deterministic assumption is not followed through
to the end, but that probabilistic assumptions, which are foreign to classical mechanics, creep in, often
without being perceived as such.
An important concept when relating classical mechanics to statistical mechanics is “quasi-ergodicity”:
The concept of quasi-ergodicity means that a “typical” trajectory in phase space comes arbitrarily close
to every point on the energy shell if one waits long enough. “Typical” are all trajectories with exception
of a few special trajectories, the initial points of which have a measure zero in the energy shell. Unstable
periodic orbits belong to this special class of trajectories. The “energy shell” is the subspace of phase
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space that has the energy of the initial state. Due to the hamiltonian character of time evolution, energy is
conserved. Due to the strongly chaotic character, there are no other conserved quantities and supposedly
no islands of regular dynamics. If we lay a grid with some cell size ǫ6N−1 over the energy shell, a typical
trajectory will have visited all cells of the grid after a time that depends on ǫ. Since there is no reason to
prefer any part of the energy shell, all parts will be visited on an average equally often. This is one way
of stating that all microstates of the system occur with equal probability.
It is also instructive to consider the time evolution of an ensemble of initial states, all of which lie in a
small compact volume in phase space. With time, the volume becomes deformed according to Liouville’s
equation, but its size does not change. Due to the stretching and folding process of chaotic motion, finer
and finer filaments of the volume will penetrate to more and more cells of our phase space grid. After
some time, all cells will contain a small part of the original volume in the form of very fine filaments. If
the size of the initial droplet presents the precision of our knowledge of the initial state, we cannot say at
all in which cell the system will be after this time. It can be anywhere with equal probability. This leads
again to the basic axiom of statistical mechanics.
In order to justify the second law of thermodynamics, an additional consideration is needed: Most
cells in the energy shell correspond to the macrostate with the largest entropy. This is a consequence of
the huge dimension of phase space. Therefore, the argument goes, even if one starts from a low-entropy
initial state, after a short time the system will reach “typical” cells in phase space, which have maximum
entropy.
3.2 The problems with the standard argument
There are two important problems with the argument outlined in the previous subsection, both of which
are closely tied to the underlying idea that the state of a system corresponds to a point in phase space.
First, as pointed out by several textbook authors, the concept of quasiergodicity poses problems,
because the time required to visit every cell in phase space is incredibly much larger than the lifetime of
the universe. During the short time of an experiment, where we observe a system to reach equilibrium,
only a vanishingly small fraction of phase space can be visited by the system. Therefore, the fundamental
theorem of statistical mechanics, i.e., the theorem of equal a priory probabilities, cannot be derived from
classical mechanics in this way. Fortunately, quasiergodicity is not required for justifying the second law
of thermodynamics, since we only need to argue that each cell in the energy shell is not far from maximum
entropy cells, which are by far the most numerous types of cells.
However, when claiming that a trajectory will after some time “most likely” or “virtually certainly”
be in cells with maximum entropy, one makes a probabilistic argument, which cannot be justified based
on classical mechanics alone, and this is the second problem with the standard derivation sketched in
the previous subsection. Stated somewhat differently and in more detail, the probabilistic argument must
be understood as follows: Given an initial state of the system, consider all future time evolutions that
are compatible with this initial state within the given precision. Assuming that all these time evolutions
happen with the same probability, and given the fact that the vast majority of these time evolutions show
an increase in entropy towards equilibrium, the system will show an increase in entropy and approach
equilibrium. Without the possibility of different time evolutions, probabilistic statements make no sense.
A strictly deterministic world with infinite-precision phase space points leaves no freedom to “choose”
the most probably time evolution, because the initial state fully contains the future time evolution.
A time evolution that does not agree with the “most probable” behavior is also compatible with
classical mechanics, as one can conclude from the fact that by going backwards in time a system will
arrive at the initial state at which it was started. Initial states with an entropy that is smaller than that
of equilibrium occur for instance when milk is poured into coffee or when the dividing barrier between
two different gases is removed. By going backwards in time, starting from equilibrium, the entropy of
these systems would decrease, and the time evolution would tend to a highly “improbable” state. We
conclude that a time evolution towards a state of lower entropy (now going again forward in time) would
in no way be in contradiction with classical mechanics. For such a case, one would have to conclude from
a deterministic point of view that the initial state, even though we cannot resolve it to the required high
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precision, was one of the “special” initial states that tend to low-entropy states at some later time. Such
states lie dense in the energy shell even though they have a measure of zero.
3.3 An alternative view
By abandoning the idea that a position in phase space has infinite precision, all the problems raised in
the previous subsection are solved. In order to show this, we start now from the assumption that a point
in phase space has limited precision, and explore its consequences. Because Hamilton’s equations do not
fix unequivocally the future time evolution, we have to combine the idea of finite precision of phase space
points with a rule that specifies which type of time evolution out of the possible ones is taken by the
system. This rule is the rule of equal probabilities for (or at least of a smooth probability distribution
over) those evolutions that are compatible with the initial state.
The assumption that points in phase space have limited precision is logically very satisfying for several
reasons. First, as already mentioned, it creates the room for employing probabilistic rules, which are the
basis of statistical mechanics. Second, a finite precision of phase space points is all that is ever needed
for “deriving” statistical mechanics from classical mechanics. In particular when discussing the concept
of quasi-ergodicity one always resorts to considering phase space with a certain resolution, given by
the mesh size of the grid mentioned above. Third, a finite precision of phase space permits a system
to reach equilibrium within a short time and to truly forget the past. With infinite precision, the time
required to visit all cells of the phase space grid is proportional to the number of cells, and many orders
of magnitude larger than the age of the universe. When the initial state and all future states have only
finite precision, which we can take to be identical to the cell size, the number of cells which the system
can reach within a certain time is larger than 1. This means that the number of cells that can be reached
from the initial state increases exponentially in time, leading to the conclusion that after a short time
the system could be anywhere on the energy shell. Furthermore, a true equilibrium state should have
no traces of the past. However, with infinite precision the state of a system would always be uniquely
related to a predecessor state at a previous moment in time. With finite precision, the number of possibly
predecessor cells increases exponentially with the length of time by which one looks back. When this time
interval becomes large enough, the system could have been anywhere on the energy shell, and the initial
state is completely forgotten.
All these considerations can be made based on classical mechanics alone in the attempt to reconcile it
with the second law of thermodynamics. Of course, it is very satisfying to know that quantum mechanics
confirms the suggestion that points in phase space have only limited precision. The uncertainty relation
makes it impossible to fix simultaneously the momenta and positions of particles to infinite precision.
Furthermore, quantum mechanics fixes the “mesh size” for the phase space grid. A cell in phase space
has the size ~3N .
An important conclusion from these considerations is that the time evolution of a thermodynamic
systems is underdetermined by classical mechanics if the idea of infinite precision is abandoned. An
additional law is required that specifies which type of time evolution is taken. This law is the law of
equal probabilities, leading naturally to the second law of thermodynamics. Thus, the second law of
thermodynamics is an emergent law in the strong sense; it is not contained in the microscopic laws of
classical mechanics.
3.4 Other ways leading from classical mechanics to the second law of ther-
modynamics
There exist other approaches to statistical mechanics, which make expressly additional assumptions that
are not part of classical mechanics. In their textbook on statistical physics, Landau and Lifschitz reject
the idea of quasi-ergodicity of a large system because of the impossibility that a system visits even a
small part of phase space within the duration of an experiment. Instead, they divide the system in many
small subsystems and note that observables are sum variables over all these subsystems. By assuming
that these subsystems are statistically independent, equal a priori probabilities and the second law of
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thermodynamics can be obtained. By assuming statistical independence of the subsystems they make an
asumption that is similar in spirit to the idea of the previous subsections. They assume that all future
time evolutions that are compatible with the initial state are equally probable: Statistical independence
of subystems means that the influence of one subsystem on a neighboring one does not depend on the
specific microscopic state of the subsystem. Rather, the influence on the neighbor is a “typical” influence,
as if the neighbor was in a random state. Specific correlations between subsystems or processes that have
taken place in the past are irrelevant for equilibrium behavior.
A similar type of assumption underlies Boltzmann’s equation. This equation describes the time evo-
lution of a gas of particles, which goes towards an equilibrium state. Since this equation appears very
plausible, one is tempted to forget that it contains assumptions that are not part of classical mechanics. In
particular, this equation relies on the assumption that correlations due to past processes are irrelevant.
Bolzmann’s equation can be derived from Hamilton’s equations by making a few simplifications. It is
based on the density of particles f(~p, ~q, t) in 6-dimensional phase space. This phase space is the phase
space of one particle, and the state of the system is represented by N points in this phase space. Time
evolution is determined by collisions between particles and by free motion in between. If no external
potential is included, Boltzmann’s equation reads
∂f(~p, ~q, t)
∂t
+~˙q·
∂f(~p, ~q, t)
∂~q
=
∫
d3p2
∫
d3p3
∫
d3p4W (~p, ~p2; ~p3, ~p4) [f(~p3, ~q, t)f(~p4, ~q, t)− f(~p, ~q, t)f(~p2, ~q, t)] .
(1)
Collisions between particles with momenta ~p3 and ~p4 lead to the momenta ~p and ~p2, or vice versa.
The function W contains the cross section for such collisions. The collision term depends only on the
products of one-particle densities f , which means that the probabilities for particles being at the position
~q are assumed to be independent from each other. Correlations between particles, which are created
by collisions, are thus neglected. The success of Boltzmann’s equation justifies this assumption, and it
means that a detailed memory of past processes is not required for predicting correctly the future time
evolution. Again, we find that the future time evolution is assumed to be a “typical” time evolution,
which results when the present microstate is a random state compatible with the observables, i.e., with
the function f(~p, ~q). It is well known that Boltzmann’s equation leads to a decrease in time of the so-called
H-function, which is the integral of (f log f) over phase space. The system approaches equilibrium, where
the H-function has its minimum, which is equivalent to the entropy having its maximum.
4 From quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics
There are essentially four approaches to connect quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics: The first
approach consists in considering a N -particle wave function of a closed system. The second approach
includes the interaction with an environment via a potential. The third approach models the environment
as consisting of many degrees of freedom. The fourth approach treats quantum mechanics as an ensemble
theory and views statistical mechanics as being part of quantum mechanics. We will briefly discuss in the
following all four approaches, their achievements and their shortcomings. We shall again see that in the
first three approaches additional assumptions must be made about correlations being absent and time
evolutions showing “typical” behavior.
4.1 The eigenstate thermalization hypothesis
A system of N interacting particles in a potential well has chaotic dynamics in classical mechanics. In
quantum mechanics, its eigenstate wave functions look very random. When dividing the volume of the
potential well in to small subvolumes, we can expect that an eigenfunction of the hamiltonian has equal
particle density in all subvolumes. The eigenstate thermalization hypothesis suggests that in fact all
expectation values of observables, evaluated with an eigenfunction, correspond to the thermal average in
equilibrium (Deutsch, 1991; Srednicki, 1994; Rigol et al, 2008). By using an appropriate superposition of
eigenstates, one can generate an initial state that is far from equilibrium, and assuming that the expansion
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coefficients are such that they do not lead to special superpositions at later times, the system is bound
to evolve towards an “equilibrium” state, where the observables have their according values.
The problems with this approach are twofold:
First, in order to obtain the “typical” time evolution towards equilibrium, we must make the assump-
tion that there are no correlations in the expansion coefficients that might lead to special, low-entropy
states at later times. This is the same type of assumption that is made in the approaches to classical
mechanics that we discussed in the previous section. Second, this approach does not give the kind of
density matrix that represents a thermodynamic equilibrium. The density matrix of this system is that
of a pure state, with diagonal elements that are constant in time and that correspond to the weights of
the different eigenfunctions in the initial state. In contrast, the density matrix at equilibrium is that of
a mixed state, which can be represented as a diagonal matrix in the basis of energy eigenstates, with all
entries being identical.
In the previous section, we have argued that the problems that arise when reconciling classical mecha-
nics with the second law of thermodynamics are resolved when abandoning the idea of infinite precision.
It appears to me that the quantum mechanical time evolution of a closed system can be reconciled with
statistical mechanics in a similar way, by abandoning the idea of infinite precision of a wave function.
Only if a wave function has finite precision does the statement make sense that the expansion coefficients
have the “most likely” property of leading to no special macrostates at later times. Furthermore, if a
wave function has finite precision, it can be compatible with many pure and mixed (infinite-precision)
states, i.e., with many different density matrices, and with many possible future time evolutions. Which
time evolution is actually taken by the system has then to be fixed by additional laws.
4.2 Interaction with the environment through a potential
This approach is due to Felix Bloch (1989), and it starts by taking the Hamilton operator to be that of
an isolated system, H0, plus an interaction potential that represents the effect of the environment. Since
no system can be completely isolated from the rest of the world, there is always some external influence.
Starting from an initial state |Ψ, 0〉 =
∑
n cn|n〉, the wave function becomes at later times
|Ψ, t〉 =
∑
n
cn(t)e
−iEnt/~|n〉 . (2)
Assuming that the interaction with the environment does (almost) not change the energy of the system,
the energy eigenvalues En are all within a very small interval. The time evolution of the coefficients cn
can be calculated to be
i~
∂cm
∂t
=
∑
n
Vmn(t)cn(t) (3)
with
Vnm(t) = 〈m|V |n〉 e
−i(En−Em)t/~ . (4)
Because the vector cn is normalized to 1 (
∑
n |cn|
2 = 1), its tip moves on the unit sphere. If the system is
ergodic in a suitable sense, the tip of the vector will come arbitrarily close to every point on this sphere.
There is a very close analogy between the trajectory cn(t) and the trajectory in phase space of a classical
mechanics trajectory. All the reasoning made above in context of classical trajectories therefore applies
also to cn(t). By abandoning the idea of infinite precision of a quantum mechanical state, the problem
that egodicity requires incredibly long time periods would be resolved as well as the problem that a
completely deterministic time evolution leaves no room for appeals to the “most likely” behavior.
4.3 Coupling to an environment with many degrees of freedom
Since the 1980s, a series of very fruitful investigations have been performed on the time evolution of a
quantum mechanical system that interacts with an environment that consists of many degrees of freedom,
all of which are also modelled quantum mechanically, for instance as harmonic oscillators. The time
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evolution of the system and all environmental degrees of freedom is taken to be a unitary time evolution
according to the Schro¨dinger equation. Accordingly, the density matrix of the full system, which includes
the environmental degress of freedom, is that of a pure state. However, when focussing on the system
of interest, the trace over the environmental degrees of freedom is taken, leading to a reduced density
matrix, which is generally that of a mixed state.
One important application of this procedure is quantum diffusion (Caldeira & Leggett, 1983), where
a particle is coupled to the environmental degrees of freedom via its position. Using the path integral
formalism and taking in the end the limit ~ → 0, one finds that that probability density that the particle
has moved during time t by a distance ~r is described by the Fokker-Planck equation. Thus, the transition
from a quantum mechanical description to a classical, stochastic description has been made. This type
of phenomenon is called “decoherence”.
Another important application of decoherence theory is that of quantum measurement. In this case,
the system couples to the many degrees of freedom of the (macroscopic) measurement apparatus via the
observable that is being measured, for instance the spin. In turns out that the reduced density matrix
of the system becomes diagonal after a very short time (Zurek, 1991; Zeh, 2002). This means that it
describes a classical probabilistic superposition of the different measurement outcomes. In a similar vein,
one can argue that the density matrix of a thermodynamic system (or a small subsystem of it) will evolve
to the density matrix of a classical superposition when the system is coupled to an environment that
consists of many degrees of freedom, and when the trace over these degrees of freedom is taken.
A close look at these calculations reveals that they rely on two types of assumptions that are similar
in spirit to the assumptions that we have discussed before. First, some type of statistical independence
or lack of special correlations between the variables that describe the environmental degrees of freedom
must be assumed. The reduced density matrix of the system becomes diagonal only if the non-diagonal
elements, which contain products of a function of the amplitudes and phases of the different environmental
degrees of freedom, decrease to zero. Second, it must be assumed that for all practical purposes the
entanglement of the system with the environment, which is pushed out of sight by taking the trace over
the environmental degrees of freedom, can be ignored. Such an entanglement would contain a full memory
of the process that has taken place since the system started to interact with the environment. Now, we
can argue once more that a finite precision of the wave function would solve these conceptual problems:
the entanglement with the environment and the perfect memory of the past could vanish with time, and
the lack of special correlations could be phrased in terms of the most probable or typical time evolution.
Critics of decoherence theory focus on its incomplete potential to explain the measurement process. If
many experiments of the same type are performed, the diagonal entries of the density matrix tell correctly
which proportion of experiments will show which measurement result. However, quantum mechanics is
taken to be a theory that describes individal systems, not just ensembles of systems. This is not the topic
of this article, but it leads us to the fourth approach to the relation between quantum and statistical
mechanics.
4.4 Quantum mechanics as a statistical theory that includes statistical me-
chanics
A view of quantum mechanics that circumvents the need to reconcile the deterministic, time-reversible
evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation with the stochastic, irreversible features of statistical mechanics,
is the statistical interpretation (Ballentine, 1970). In this interpretation, quantum mechanics is viewed
as an ensemble theory, which gives probabilities for measurement outcomes. By extending this theory
to include mixed states, statistical mechanics becomes part of quantum mechanics. The price for this
elegant solution of our problem is the incompleteness of the theory, because individual systems cannot
be described by it. However, this is again not the topic of this article.
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5 Conclusions
By taking a close look at the different “derivations” of statistical mechanics, in particular of the second
law of thermodynamics, from classical or quantum mechanics, we have seen that all these derivations
make similar assumptions that go beyond the deterministic, time-reversible microscopic theory from
which they start. All derivations assume that the time evolution of the system is “typical” in some sense.
This means that the most likely type of time evolution of observable variables, given our knowledge
of the system, does occur. If the time evolution of the system was deterministic on the microscopic
level, our probabilistic statements about the system would merely be due to our ignorance of the precise
microscopic state. However, in this case there would be no conclusive reason why the time evolution of
the system should comply with our ignorance and take the “most likely” route, because other routes
would also be compatible with our knowledge of the initial state. Furthermore, when looking into the
past, the evolution backwards in time does not take the most likely route. We must therefore understand
the rule of equal probabilities as an additional law that is required to correctly describe the behavior of
the system. However, there would be no room for an additional law if the laws of classical or quantum
mechanics did fully determine the time evolution of the system. We are therefore led to conclude that
the description in terms of classical or quantum mechanics is only an approximate description, and that
points in phase space or wave function have only a limited precision. This line of reasoning is consistent
with other philosophical and scientific arguments. From the philosophical point of view, the concept of
infinite precision of a state is a metaphysical idea that can not, even in principle, be tested. From a
scientific point of view, we know that Newton’s (or Hamilton’s) equations of motion and the Schro¨dinger
equation are only an approximation to reality. The fact that these two theories work so well for many
applications can make us blind to the the possibility that their limited precision may have strong effects
in systems that consist of macroscopic numbers of nonlinearly interacting particles. Such complex systems
are therefore not simply the sum of their parts, but are ruled by new laws that are not contained in a
microscopic description.
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